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This paper empirically tests the dynamics of credit cards and monetary policy in the 
context of Indonesia. Using monthly data from 2006 to 2018 and a structural vector 
autoregressive model, our findings indicate that credit card usage is mainly driven 
by Indonesia’s fast economic growth over the last decade, which indeed reflects the 
role of credit cards in consumption smoothing. The study also finds that monetary 
policy transmission through the lending channel is weak, with a more prevalent role 
for exchange rates and global oil prices in the transmission process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Technology has digitized monetary transactions across the world, including 
payment mechanisms such as debit and credit cards and online payments. These 
payment mechanisms have various benefits, such as their smoothness, transparency, 
speed, and efficiency. However, digitized transactions also pose many challenges 
to policymakers. One such challenge is the smooth implementation of monetary 
policy. In this paper, we explore possible interactions between credit card usage 
and monetary policy in the Indonesian context.
Indonesia, one of the growing emerging economies in the world, has 
experienced a considerable rise in credit card usage over the past decade.1 Figure 
1 shows that the volume of credit card transactions increased significantly, from 
113 million to 338 million during 2006–2018. The growth in both volume and 
transactions was also found to be high during 2006–2010, with annual compound 
average growths in volume and the value of transactions of 12.5% and 24.5%, 
compared to 6% and 7.5% for 2011–2018 (Figure 2). Although credit cards can be 
used to withdraw cash, as well as for purchases, their use for cash withdrawals 
in terms of the total value of transactions is very low, around 3% in 2018, with 
the remaining 97% used for purchases (see Figure 3). These observations are a 
clear indication of an upsurge in credit card usage in the overall consumer credit 
market. Indonesia experienced a high growth trajectory during these periods. The 
excessive use of credit cards seems to indicate the possession of less money, since 
the individual uses less money for transactions. However, it is also argued that 
the excessive use of credit cards leads to more spending and, thus, higher prices. 
Bank Indonesia (BI) has adopted an inflation-targeting framework as the primary 
objective of its monetary policy, and the extensive use of credit cards will thus 
have significant implications on its effectiveness. This study is therefore warranted, 
given the present context of high credit card usage in Indonesia. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the 
literature and presents the hypotheses and methodology. Sections III and IV 
discuss the econometric framework and data, respectively. Section V presents the 
empirical findings and Section VI concludes the paper.
1 Credit card ownership is low in Indonesia compared to other emerging economies. According to 
the Global Findex database (World Bank, 2017), credit card ownership in Indonesia among people 
above the age of 15 was around 2% in 2017 compared to India (3%), China (31%), Brazil (21%), and 
Malaysia (21%).
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Figure 1.  Usage of Credit Card
The figure presents trends in credit card transactions in Indonesia. Value of transactions are reported in IDR trillion, 
whereas volume of transactions are reported in millions.  The data come from CEIC and Bank Indonesia website.
Figure 2. Growth of Credit Card transactions (CAGR, in percentages)
The figure represents the compound annual growth of volume and value of credit card transactions in Indonesia for 
two sub-periods 2006-2010 and 2011-2018. The values are represented in percentages, and data come from CEIC and 
Bank Indonesia website. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODOLOGY
According to Fulford and Schuh (2018), the availability of credit cards helps 
individuals make three important decisions: First, credit cards help smooth their 
consumption when their income drops; hence, it is considered as an instrument to 
meet the precautionary and liquidity needs. Second, they can be used to revolve 
debt over the short and long term, and credit cards are thus a way of allocating 
life cycle consumption. Finally, as a means of payment, the amount spent with 
credit cards comprises part of consumer expenditures. Therefore, the economic 
implications of credit cards become more broader as their usage increases.
The literature on credit cards, especially related to monetary policy, generally 
focuses on the following: 1) the role of central banks in digital money and their 
independence in terms of monetary policy and 2) the implications of credit cards 
on monetary policy transmission. Regarding the first focus, studies suggest that 
the substitution of money with any alternative payment option, such as credit 
cards, debit cards, and digital currencies, reduces the overall demand for money 
in the economy (Akhand and Milbourne, 1986; Yilmazkuday and Yazgan, 2011). 
The usage of credit cards reduces the demand for money for transaction purposes, 
since they can be used as a medium of exchange in the transactions (Mandell, 
1972). Hence, the traditional approach of implementing a monetary policy based 
on changing the monetary base might not be effective; for instance, the possibilities 
of raising seigniorage (income from printing money) using monetary policy would 
be limited. Therefore, central banks could be forced to depend on governmental 
financial support for their operational needs, thus affecting the independence 
of their monetary policy (Friedman, 1999; Freedman, 2000; Goodhart, 2000; 
Woodford, 2000).
Regarding the second focus, credit cards and monetary transmission, various 
challenges are posed by credit cards in the implementation of monetary policy. 
The usage of credit cards doubles the velocity of money, since the cash proceeds 
Figure 3. Usage of Credit Card for Purchase and Cash Withdrawal
The figure represents the proportion of credit card usage (value of transactions) in terms of purchase and cash 
withdrawal. The values are represented in percentages for two years, i.e., 2006 and 2018, and data come from CEIC 
and Bank Indonesia website.
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from the sale of goods can be reused to pay the debt on credit card purchases. 
Theoretically, the velocity of money is inversely proportional to the demand for 
money, and hence lower demand for money due to credit card usage increases 
the velocity of money (Geanakoplos and Dubey, 2010). A high level of money 
velocity increases inflation, which can deviate from the central bank’s inflation 
target. Similarly, the lower demand for money reduces the demand for central 
bank’s reserves, which in turn shrinks the central bank’s balance sheet. The 
lower demand thus reduces the central bank’s ability to influence the short-term 
interest rate through open market operations (Friedman, 1999, 2000). Moreover, 
the evidence suggests that the central bank’s balance sheet is potentially reduced 
through the increased use of electronic money, with serious implications on the 
bank’s ability to effectively manage monetary policy and carry out its functions as 
lender of last resort (Bank for International Settlements, 2015).
It is also argued that inflation in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s 
coincided with the introduction of credit cards (Geanakoplos and Dubey, 2010). 
Credit card usage can stimulate spending, since consumers underestimate or forget 
credit card purchases, because the act of paying by credit card is less painful than 
paying by cash or check (Soman, 2001). Moreover, the interest rates charged on 
credit cards are sticky and do not change with monetary policy, which complicates 
the implications of monetary policy through the credit card channel (Calem and 
Mester, 1995). If credit card interest rates were elastic in response to changes in the 
policy rate, monetary policy would have a multiplier effect on the consumption 
level through the availability of credit card funds. Further, Yilmazkuday (2011) 
argues that a contractionary monetary policy forces commercial banks to restrict 
lending through credit cards, and the credit (or lending) channel of monetary 
policy transmission would therefore be more effective in the presence of credit 
cards, compared to other channels of monetary transmission, such as the interest 
and exchange rates. Moreover, external risk factors, such as fluctuations in oil price 
and exchange rates, further complicate the mechanism of monetary transmission. 
Hence, it would be interesting to analyze the role of credit cards in monetary 
policy transmission, along with other global risk factors, such as exchange rates 
and oil price shocks.
Given this background, this paper examines the following questions in the 
context of Indonesia: 1) Does credit card usage play any role in the transmission of 
monetary policy? 2) Is the prevalence of the lending channel in the transmission of 
monetary policy due to credit card usage, as compared to other channels? 3) Does 
credit card play a consumption-smoothing role in monetary policy dynamics? 
Since studies related to the impact of credit cards on monetary transmission are 
relatively scarce, our paper marks an essential contribution to the literature in the 
following ways: 1) It is the first study that examines monetary policy transmission 
by taking into account global risk factors such as oil price shocks in the presence of 
credit card usage; 2) it is one of the first attempts to examine the empirical relation 
between credit card usage and monetary policy transmission, using a structural 
vector autoregressive (SVAR) approach; and 3) it is the first attempt to understand 
the dynamics of monetary policy in the presence of credit card usage in the context 
of Indonesia.
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In this paper, we hypothesize the following: 1) Credit card usage reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary policy transmission because it raises price levels due 
to the high velocity of money (Friedman, 1999, 2000), and 2) credit card usage is 
positively affected by income levels, since higher income or output encourages 
consumers to spend more on consumption with credit cards and hence supports 
the consumption-smoothing role of credit cards Yazgan and Yilmazkuday (2011) 
Fulford and Schuh, (2017).2 Similarly, credit card usage is negatively affected 
by interest rates, since they represent the opportunity cost of credit card usage, 
especially when credit card debt is not paid on time Yilmazkuday (2011). In 
addition, exchange rates and global oil prices affect domestic price levels through 
international trade, as we assume Indonesia to be a small open economy (Basnet 
and Upadhyaya, 2015). Finally, the central bank alters the policy rate to curb 
inflation, since BI has officially adopted an inflation-targeting framework.
Our approach to testing the above interlinkage is as follows. We use monthly 
data from 2006 to 2018 and an SVAR model. We use impulse response function 
analysis and forecast error variance to analyze monetary transmission. Further, the 
analysis includes commercial bank lending, to account for the lending channel of 
monetary policy. Accordingly, monetary policy actions affect the lending capacity 
of commercial banks and thus affect monetary policy targets. Similarly, we also 
incorporate exchange rates and global oil prices into the analysis to account for 
external shocks. Our empirical findings suggest the following. First, credit card 
usage is significantly explained by output, indicating the consumption-smoothing 
role of credit cards. Second, credit card usage is not affected by the interest rates, 
indicating the stickiness of interest rate charged on credit card. Fourth, variations 
in policy rates are significantly determined by variations in inflation, supporting 
the inflation-targeting objective of BI’s monetary policy. Fifth, global oil prices play 
a significant role in explaining domestic inflation, indicating that external shocks 
pass through to domestic inflation. Finally, the impact of policy rates on inflation 
through the lending channel is not strong; however, the role of exchange rates in 
the transmission process is more prevalent, because exchange rate variations affect 
the liquidity conditions of commercial banks.
III. ECONOMETRIC FRAMEWORK
This paper employs an SVAR model to analyze the dynamics of credit card usage 
and monetary policy.3 The SVAR model is an alternative to the simultaneous 
equation models originally proposed by Sims (1980). A standard SVAR model can 
be written as
                                                        
2 The level of income is an important indicator of consumers’ repayment patterns. Households with 
highly liquid assets or income are more likely to use credit cards for transactions and pay their credit 
card debt on time (Canner and Cyrnak, 1985; Zhang and DeVaney, 1999).
3 Most of the studies that analyze the monetary policy transmission mechanism use SVAR models, 
due to their dynamic nature, compared to other econometric techniques. For a survey on the use of 
SVAR models of the monetary transmission mechanism, see Christiano et al. (1999).
(1)
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where Xt is an n×1 vector of variables at time t, A0 and B are n×n matrixes of 
coefficients,  indicates the matrix polynomial in the lag operator, 
the matrix B contains the structural form parameter of the model, and εt is an n×1 
vector of serially uncorrelated and zero-mean structural shocks with an identity 
covariance matrix  = I. The reduced form of the model can be expressed 
as
where , with A0 ut=Bt.
The residuals ut from the reduced vector autoregressive model are also 
assumed to be white noise, but can be correlated with each other due to the 
contemporaneous effect of the variables across equations. Therefore, to identify 
structural shocks, we must impose restrictions in the equation. We employ an 
identification strategy applying short-run restrictions on the contemporaneous 
coefficients in A0. More precisely, to exactly identify the structural shocks, we need 
to impose n(n-1)/2 restrictions.
To address the research issue, we estimate three separate SVAR models.4 In 
model 1, we include four variables in the SVAR system, that is, output, inflation, 
credit card transactions, and the domestic policy interest rate.
The identification strategies for model 1 are as follows:
Xt = (Output, Inflation, Credit, Interest rate)                                     
where output is assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to the other variables 
in the system, since the SVAR literature on monetary policy indicates that real 
variables, such as output, respond with a lag to the exogenous shocks of monetary 
variables (Sims, 2007; Abouwafia and Chambers, 2015). Similarly, inflation is also 
assumed to be contemporaneously exogenous to credit card transactions and 
interest rates, due to the delay in changes in prices (Friedman, 1961). We also 
assume that credit card transactions (credit) do not respond contemporaneously 
to changes in the interest rate, due to the sticky nature of interest rate charged 
on credit card (Calem and Mester, 1995). Finally, the policy rate (interest rate) 
is contemporaneously exogenous to output, since information related to output 
would not be available to the policy makers the same month, and the interest rate 
is therefore only set after the output information from the previous month has 
been observed (Leigh, 2005).
4  We closely follow the SVAR approach of Prabheesh and Vidya (2018). 
(2)
(3)
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In model 2, we expand the above model by including information related to 
commercial banks’ lending and exchange rates.5 The inclusion of these variables 
will help us to identify the interaction of the credit card effect on monetary policy 
transmission through lending and the exchange rate channel.
The identification strategies for model 2 are as follows:
Xt = (Output, Inflation, Credit, Lending, Interest rate, Exchange rate)
where we assume commercial bank lending does not respond contemporaneously 
to the interest rate, since they do not change lending rates quickly in response 
to monetary policy changes, and lending thus changes with a lag. However, 
exchange rate is contemporaneously endogenous to all the other variables in the 
system, since they respond quickly to changes in real variables as well as monetary 
variables in the system.
Finally, in model 3, we incorporate global oil prices to account for global 
supply shocks, since increases in oil prices can increase the cost of production 
and thus lead to higher price levels (Narayan et al., 2014; Besnet and Upadhyaya, 
2015). Hence, the central bank is assumed to react to global oil price movements by 
changing the policy rate. In this case, we assume oil prices are contemporaneously 
exogenous to all the other factors in the system. The identification strategies for 
model 3 are as follows:
Xt = (Oil, Output, Inflation, Credit, Interest rate, Exchange rate)6
5 The incorporation of inflation and exchange rate also helps address well-known price and exchange 
rate puzzles whereby inflation increases and the exchange rate depreciates, given a contractionary 
monetary policy (Sims, 1992; Cushman and Zha, 1997). A similar approach is adopted by Juhro and 
Iyke (2019) to address the effect of monetary transmission on financial conditions in Indonesia.
6 To maintain degrees of freedom, we do not include commercial bank lending in model 3.
(4)
(5)
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We use structural variance decomposition and structural impulse response 
functions to examine the dynamics of the variables in the SVAR system. Impulse 
response functions are helpful for analyzing the response of one variable to a 
shock to the other variables in the system. Variance decomposition assesses the 
percentage of forecast error explained by the innovation of each variable in the 
system.
IV. DATA
The study utilizes monthly data from January 2006 to December 2018, collected 
from various BI reports. The beginning period is attributed to the availability 
of data related to credit card transactions in Indonesia. The policy interest rate 
is proxied by the BI rate, which is an indicator of the monetary policy stance. 
The industrial production index is taken as a measure of output, due to the 
unavailability of monthly output data. Credit card usage is measured in real terms 
(i.e., the total value of credit card transactions divided by the Consumer Price 
Index), and inflation is measured as the percentage change in the Consumer Price 
Index corresponding to its previous year same month. Moreover, the industrial 
production index, credit card transactions, and bank lending are measured in 
percentage changes, seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s X-12 method.7 
The exchange rate is measured as the number of Indonesian rupiahs in US dollars. 
Oil prices are proxied for by the percentage changes in Cushing, Oklahoma, and 
West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices, taken from the US Energy Information 
Administration.8 Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics, such as the mean, 
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, and Jarque–Bera statistics, of the variables 
considered for the analysis. It is interesting to note that credit card usage has a high 
standard deviation (14), indicating large fluctuations during the study period. The 
Jarque–Bera statistics show a non-normal credit card usage distribution.
7 We follow an approach similar to that of Yilmazkuday (2011).
8 See https://www.eia.gov.
Table 1.
 Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for the period 2007-2018. The mean, standard deviation (SD), skewness, 
Jarque–Bera (JB) test coefficient and its respective p-value are presented in parenthesis. The JB test examines the null 
hypothesis of a normal distribution. The variables, noted in column 1, namely output, credit, lending and oil denote 
the growth rate of the index of industrial production, credit card transactions, commercial banks’ lending and oil 
prices, respectively.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera
Output 4.15 3.95 -0.44 4.98 28.40(0.00)
Inflation 5.48 2.25 0.99 3.60 25.76 (0.00)
Credit 15.90 14.60 1.11 3.86 34.17 (0.00)
Lending 11.50 6.29 0.13 1.62 11.71(0.00)
Interest Rate 6.70 1.32 -0.008 2.40 2.10 (0.34)
Exchange Rate 11136.5 2023.2 0.28 1.50 15.32 (0.00)
Oil 6.57 36.50 0.32 2.91 2.56 (0.276)
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
As a first step, we examined the stationarity properties of the variables. Since 
standard unit root tests, such as the augmented Dickey–Fuller test and Phillip–
Peron tests, do not take into account possible structural breaks in the data series, this 
study employs the unit root test proposed by Narayan and Popp (2010; hereafter 
NP) that accounts for two endogenous structural breaks. The main highlight of 
this test, compared to other structural break tests, such as those of Lumsdaine and 
Papell (1997) and Lee and Strazicich (2003), is that it uses a Dickey–Fuller-type 
test approach and the break date is determined by maximizing the significance 
of the break date coefficient. The NP test has good size and stable power and 
identifies the structural breaks accurately in finite samples. The NP test suggests 
two models, M1 and M2, that permit two breaks in levels and two breaks in level 
and trend, respectively. The test statistics reported in Table 2 shows that the null of 
the unit root can be rejected in all cases except the exchange rate, as for model M1 
(intercept). Moreover, the break dates are found to be in various months during 
2009–2011 for most of the variables. For instance, credit card growth experienced 
a break in the first month of 2010 and in the sixth month of 2011. Our empirical 
findings for the structural break test are in line with those of Sharma et al. (2018), 
who find that most of the macroeconomic data of Indonesia suffer from structural 
breaks. 
Table 2.
Structural Break Unit Root Test
This table shows the Narayan and Popp (2010) unit root test results for monthly data. We refer to Table 3 of Narayan 
and Popp (2010) for critical values for unknown break dates. Models 1 and 2 are two models for testing unit root. 
Model 1 (see Column 2, denoted M1) allows for two breaks in intercept and the Model 2 allows for two breaks in 
intercept as well as trend (see Column 2, denoted M2). The true break dates are denoted by TB1 and TB2; k represents 
the optimal lag length; and ***, **, and * indicate that the unit root null hypothesis is rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels of significance, respectively. In in the break date, for example 2011M8 denotes month. Similarly, output, credit, 
lending and oil denote growth rate of the index of industrial production, credit card transactions, commercial banks’ 
lending, and oil prices, respectively.
M1: Two Breaks in Intercept M2: Two Breaks in Intercept and Trend
Variables k t-stat TB1 TB2 Lag t-stat TB1 TB2
Output 0 -0.579
(-6.704)*
2011M8 2012M1 0 -0.537
(-6.156)*
2011M8 2012M2
Inflation 4 -0.122
(-4.202)**
2013M6 2014M12 4 -0.120
(-4.290)
2013M6 2014M12
Credit 2 -0.400
(-4.210)**
2010M1 2011M6 3 -0.487
(-4.523)***
2010M1 2010M6
Lending 4 -0.083
(-3.859)***
2009M8 2011M11 2 -0.030
(-1.153)
2011M11 2010M6
Interest Rate 4 -0.783
(-6.741)*
2009M9 2009M11 4 -0.810
(-6.821)*
2009M9 2009M11
Exchange Rate 4 -0.072
(-1.622)
2013M10 2015M9 4 -0.132
(-2.805)
2013M10 2015M9
Oil 4 -0.780
(-6.741)*
2009M9 2010M9 4 -0.810
(-6.821)*
2009M9 2010M9
Critical Values for Unit root test           1% 5% 10%
Model M1 (Break in Intercept only) -4.731 -4.136 - 3.825
Model M2 (Break in Intercept and 
Trend) -5.318 -4.741 -4.430
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To perform the SVAR test, we convert the exchange rate into first differences to 
ensure stationary variable levels. The optional lag length for vector autoregression 
is then determined through the Schwarz–Bayesian and likelihood ratio criteria, 
which, respectively, find three to be the optimal number of lags for model 1 and 
two for models 2 and 3. The models fulfill the criteria for diagnostic tests of, for 
example, autocorrelation, normality, and heteroskedasticity. Apart from that, the 
intercept dummy variables are included, are considered exogenous in the SVAR 
system, and correspond to the break dates suggested by the NP test.
A. Estimation of Model 1
The impulse response function for the SVAR system is depicted in Figure 4. The 
dashed lines correspond to plus or minus two standard errors around the impulse 
responses. It is evident from Figure 4 that the interest rate significantly and 
positively responds to a positive shock on inflation, and the response is statistically 
significant for up to four months. This finding is not surprising, since BI adheres 
to an inflation-targeting policy and thus changes the policy rate when inflation 
deviates from its target, a monetary policy strategy popularly known as the Taylor 
rule. It is also important to note that in interest rate does not respond to output 
and credit card transactions, which further underlines BI’s preference for inflation 
over output. However, the response of inflation to changes in the interest rate is 
found to be negative, but the effect is not statistically significant, signaling weak 
monetary policy transmission through the lending channel.
It is also interesting to note that inflation responds positively to increase 
in credit card transactions. The rise in inflation can be attributed to the higher 
velocity of money with the use of credit cards. Similarly, the response of credit 
cards to output is positive and significant. The significant effect of output on credit 
card usage indicates that consumers use credit cards for transactions or purchases 
when their incomes increase. This finding underscores the role of credit cards in 
consumption smoothing among high-income consumers. It is also evident that 
the policy rate does not have any significant effect on credit card usage. This 
finding could be attributed to the sticky interest rates charged on credit cards. 
This inelasticity of credit card usage to the policy rate could weaken monetary 
transmission through the credit card channel.
Table 3 reports the variance decomposition results. It reveals that variations in 
output are largely driven by variation in the output itself (94% in the 10th month). 
Similarly, variations in inflation are largely explained by inflation’s own variations, 
that is, around 84% in the 10th month, whereas the contributions of output and the 
interest rate to inflation are found to be 0.8% and 9.6%, respectively. Importantly, 
output explains around 38% of the variation in credit card transactions in the 
10th month, further shedding light on the role of the rapid economic growth in 
Indonesia over the last decade on credit card usage. Similarly, around 15% of the 
variation in interest rates is explained by inflation.
The key findings of the analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. Inflation significantly explains the variations in interest rate, reflecting the 
central bank’s monetary policy response to price stability.
2. Credit card transactions marginally explain variations in inflation.
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3. Output significantly explains variations in credit card transactions, indicating 
the role of credit cards in consumption smoothing.
4. The impact of the policy rate on inflation is not statistically significant, 
indicating the weak transmission of monetary policy through the lending 
channel.
Table 3.
Variance Decomposition of Forecasted Variables (Model 1)
This table shows the variance decomposition of Model 1 estimated using the SVAR methodology. These 
decompositions show the proportion of the variance in the forecast error of a variable that can be attributable to its 
own innovations and innovations in other variable in the VAR system. Here, output and credit denote growth rate of 
the index of industrial production and credit card transactions, respectively.
Period Output Inflation Credit Interest Rate
Panel A: Variance Decomposition of Output
1 99.99 0.00 0.00 0.01
5 94.38 4.31 0.79 0.52
10 93.89 4.68 0.90 0.53
Panel B: Variance Decomposition of Inflation
1 0.01 92.25 0.23 7.51
5 0.77 83.82 5.84 9.57
10 0.83 83.68 5.86 9.63
Panel C: Variance Decomposition of Credit
1 0.72 0.00 99.26 0.02
5 36.50 1.56 60.27 1.67
10 38.04 1.98 58.34 1.64
Panel D: Variance Decomposition of Interest Rate
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
5 0.50 14.76 0.90 83.84
10 0.67 15.06 0.92 83.34
Figure 4. Impulse Response Function (Model 1)
This figure represents the impulse response functions derived from the SVAR model (Model 1).  The impulse response 
function traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock to one of the variables on current and future values of all 
the endogenous variables in the VAR system. Dashed lines represent the intervals of two standard deviations, while 
the solid lines represent the impulse function.
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Figure 4. Impulse Response Function (Model 1) (Continued)
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B. Estimation of Model 2
Figure 5 shows additional insights on the dynamics of monetary policy and 
credit card usage when taking to account exchange rates and commercial bank 
lending. It is interesting to note that the response of the interest rate to inflation is 
positive and statistically significant. This finding again indicates the central bank’s 
reactions to inflation, which is consistent with BI’s inflation-targeting policies. 
However, the response of lending to the interest rate is not found to be significant, 
providing evidence of weak monetary transmission through lending channel. 
This result could be attributed to a delay in commercial banks adjusting their 
lending rate in response to the central bank’s policy actions. More importantly, 
bank lending responds positively to credit card usage, which could reflect the 
pro-lending behavior of commercial banks toward credit card holders. In other 
words, credit card usage boosts commercial banks’ lending activities in Indonesia. 
Figure 5 also shows that commercial banks’ lending responds to exchange rates. 
Exchange rate depreciation leads to a significant decline in lending in the third 
month, reflecting the liquidity crunch faced by commercial banks during domestic 
currency depreciation.
The impulse response functions of credit cards show that credit card usage is 
positively and significantly affected by output and lending. These findings reiterate 
the role of income and commercial bank lending in determining credit card usage. 
Inflation responds positively and significantly to variations in the exchange rate, 
indicating that the depreciation of domestic currency leads to higher inflation. 
This result underscores the role of external shocks in determining inflation in 
Indonesia. Unlike in the previous section, the response of inflation to credit card 
usage is not found to be significant here. However, the response of inflation to 
the interest rate is also insignificant, which is consistent with the findings in the 
previous section. Output is again found to not be responsive to any of the variables 
in the system, except its own variations.
Figure 4. Impulse Response Function (Model 1) (Continued)
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The variance decomposition results reported in Table 4 further show that the 
exchange rate explains around 15% of the variations in inflation and 17% of the 
variations in bank lending. Output and lending explain 36% and 10% variations in 
credit card usage, respectively. Similarly, inflation explains 12.9% of the change in 
interest rate, but the interest rate explains only 4.5% of the variation in inflation. 
Similarly, variations in output are largely explained by their own variations, 
suggesting stable output during the study period.
The key results can be summarized as follows:
1. The exchange rate significantly explains variations in inflation, indicating 
international shocks pass through to domestic inflation.
2. Taking into account the exchange rate, the effect of credit card usage on 
inflation is found to be nonsignificant.
3. The exchange rate significantly explains commercial banks’ lending, indicating 
the liquidity stress banks face during exchange rate depreciation.
4. Output significantly explains variations in credit card usage, indicating the 
consumption-smoothing role of credit cards at higher income levels.
5. Monetary policy transmission is found to be more prevalent through the 
exchange rate than through the lending channel.
Figure 5. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 2)
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
This figure represents the impulse response functions derived from the SVAR model (Model 2).  The impulse response 
function traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock to one of the variables on current and future values of all 
the endogenous variables in the VAR system. Dashed lines represent the intervals of two standard deviations, while 
the solid lines represent the impulse function. 
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Figure 5. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 2) (Continued)
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Figure 5. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 2) (Continued)
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Figure 5. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 2) (Continued)
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Table 4.
Variance Decomposition of Forecasted Variables (Model 2)
This table shows the variance decomposition of Model 2 estimated using the SVAR methodology. These 
decompositions show the proportion of the variance in the forecast error of a variable that can be attributable to its 
own innovations and innovations in other variable in the VAR system. The variables, namely output, credit, lending 
and oil denote the growth rate of the index of industrial production, credit card transactions, commercial banks’ 
lending and oil prices, respectively.
Period Output Inflation Credit Lending
Interest 
Rate
Exchange Rate
Panel A: Variance Decomposition of Output
1 98.07 0.00 0.00 0.69 1.22 0.00
5 90.07 2.81 1.06 2.40 1.89 1.73
10 85.96 3.23 2.34 2.56 2.92 2.95
Panel B: Variance Decomposition of Inflation
1 0.05 93.10 1.15 2.25 3.42 0.00
5 2.64 81.31 2.02 1.86 3.93 8.21
10 2.76 75.42 2.10 1.98 4.59 15.12
Panel C: Variance Decomposition of Credit
1 0.18 0.00 94.87 4.94 0.00 0.00
5 36.96 2.04 43.54 9.21 4.530 3.68
10 36.52 1.99 40.95 10.44 5.78 4.28
Panel D: Variance Decomposition of Lending
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.97 0.02 0.00
5 2.77 5.33 13.50 61.02 3.36 13.99
10 4.32 5.12 13.43 53.79 5.93 17.38
Panel E: Variance Decomposition of Interest Rate
1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00
5 3.13 11.47 0.73 1.49 80.52 2.63
10 4.93 12.99 0.79 1.48 75.36 4.43
Panel F: Variance Decomposition of Exchange Rate
1 0.01 0.65 6.16 2.75 0.02 90.38
5 5.53 3.92 5.36 3.91 5.48 75.77
10 6.80 5.52 5.18 3.69 7.04 71.75
C. Estimation of Model 3
Since we have seen, in the previous section, the greater role of international shock 
pass-through to domestic inflation through the exchange rate, in this section we 
include world oil prices in the analysis. Figure 6 exhibits the impulse response 
function of the SVAR model 3. The response of inflation to oil price is positive and 
statistically significant from the second to the seventh months, a clear indication of 
global oil price pass-through to domestic inflation. This could be due to Indonesia’s 
high oil import levels in recent years. Although Indonesia is one of the members 
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), after 2004 it 
became a net importer of oil due to increased consumption, along with a decline 
in oil production (US Energy Information Administration, 2015).9 Similarly, it is 
9 Due to the decline in oil production, Indonesia suspended its OPEC membership in 2008. It 
reactivated it in 2016 but suspended it again in 2018 (OPEC, 2019).
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interesting to see that the response of the exchange rate to oil prices is also positive 
and statistically significant, which implies that an increase in oil prices in the world 
market depreciates the domestic currency. Since Indonesia is a net importer of oil, 
an increase in oil prices in the international market would induce a high current 
account deficit, leading to high demand for foreign currency and depreciation of 
the domestic currency.
The response of inflation to the exchange rate is also found to be positive and 
significant, indicating that depreciation of the domestic currency leads to inflation, 
again emphasizing the relevance of the exchange rate channel in monetary policy 
transmission. The domestic interest rate can also be seen to respond positively 
to oil prices, indicating that the central bank accounts for oil price dynamics 
when framing monetary policy. Moreover, oil prices are found to be unaffected 
by any of the domestic variables in the system, underscoring their exogeneity. 
The remainder of the findings, especially related to credit cards, is consistent with 
those in the previous section.
The variance decomposition results shown in Table 5 reveal that around 14% of 
the variation in inflation is explained by oil prices, emphasizing the role of global 
oil price pass-through to prices, while the exchange rate contributes around 8% of 
the variation in inflation, which is lower than in model 2 (15%), as reported in Table 
4. This finding shows that the inclusion of oil prices in the model decreases the role 
of the exchange rate in explaining inflation. In other words, once the source of 
external shock is accommodated for in the model through oil prices, the role of the 
mediator variable, that is, the exchange rate, is moderated. We can also see that oil 
prices explain around 7% of the variation in the exchange rate.
The key findings from this section can be summarized as follows:
1. Oil prices significantly explain variations in inflation, indicating the 
international shock pass-through to domestic inflation.
2. The inclusion of oil prices in the model moderates the effect of the exchange 
rate on inflation.
3. Oil prices significantly explain the policy rate, indicating that the central bank 
accommodates oil price–related information when framing monetary policy.
Figure 6. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 3)
Response to Structural One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
This figure represents the impulse response functions derived from the SVAR model (Model 3).  The impulse response 
function traces the effect of a one standard deviation shock to one of the variables on current and future values of all 
the endogenous variables in the VAR system. Dashed lines represent the intervals of two standard deviations, while 
the solid lines represent the impulse function.
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Figure 6. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 3) (Continued)
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Figure 6. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 3) (Continued)
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Figure 6. 
Impulse Response Function (Model 3) (Continued)
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Table 5.
Variance Decomposition of Forecasted Variables (Model 3)
This table shows the variance decomposition of Model 3 estimated using the SVAR methodology. These 
decompositions show the proportion of the variance in the forecast error of a variable that can be attributable to its 
own innovations and innovations in other variable in the VAR system. The variables, namely output, credit, lending 
and oil denote the growth rate of the index of industrial production, credit card transactions, commercial banks’ 
lending and oil prices, respectively.
Period Oil Output Inflation Credit Interest Rate Exchange Rate
Panel A: Variance Decomposition of Oil
1 100 0 0 0 0 0
5 96.44 1.24 0.04 0.87 1.34 0.07
10 94 1.3 0.21 0.79 3.64 0.06
Panel B: Variance Decomposition of Output
1 0.04 99.96 0 0 0 0
5 6.3 89.35 1.45 0.44 1.88 0.59
10 6.55 88.67 1.44 0.54 2.11 0.69
Panel C: Variance Decomposition of Inflation
1 0.75 0.03 99.22 0 0 0
5 10.05 0.9 81.03 0.26 0.14 7.61
10 14.23 1 75.5 0.28 0.51 8.48
Panel D: Variance Decomposition of Credit
1 0.04 0.59 0.01 99.36 0 0
5 2.23 30.06 0.68 62.08 4.38 0.57
10 2.72 34.01 0.79 57.43 4.4 0.65
Panel E: Variance Decomposition of Interest rate
1 0.03 0.31 3.37 1.02 95.26 0
5 9.93 2.33 8.23 2 77.05 0.46
10 14.03 2.62 12.36 1.9 68.68 0.42
Panel F: Variance Decomposition of Exchange rate
1 0.93 0.66 2.3 3.09 1.74 91.28
5 7.15 2.52 2.93 3.69 4.22 79.5
10 7.2 2.69 2.89 3.7 5.59 77.93
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates monetary policy transmission in the presence of credit 
card usage in the context of Indonesia. Since Indonesia has adopted an inflation-
targeting policy, excessive credit card usage is expected to have important 
implications for monetary policy. Using monthly data from 2006 to 2018 and 
an SVAR framework, we find that credit card usage marginally affects domestic 
inflation. However, taking into account the exchange rate, we find credit card 
usage has an insignificant effect on domestic inflation. Interestingly, our results 
show that credit card usage in Indonesia is mainly driven by the country’s rapid 
economic growth over the last decade, which indeed reflects the role of credit cards 
in consumption smoothing. However, credit card usage is not found to be sensitive 
to policy rates, indicating that sticky interest rates prevail in the credit card market. 
Our empirical findings also provide evidence of commercial banks’ proactive 
lending to credit card users. Finally, monetary policy transmission through the 
lending channel is found to be weak, since neither commercial bank lending nor 
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credit card transactions respond to changes in the policy rate. However, the role 
of external factors, such as global oil price movements and exchange rates, is more 
prevalent in the transmission process, stressing the need to account for global risk 
factors while framing monetary policies.
REFERENCE
Abouwafia, H. E., and Chambers, M.J. (2015). Monetary Policy, Exchange Rates 
and Stock Prices in the Middle East Region. International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 37, 14–28.
Akhand, H., and Milbourne, R. (1986). Credit Cards and Aggregate Money 
Demand. Journal of Macroeconomics, 8, 471-78.
Basnet, H. C., and Upadhyaya, K, P. (2015). Impact of Oil Price Shocks on Output, 
Inflation and the Real Exchange Rate: Evidence from Selected ASEAN 
Countries. Applied Economics, 47(29), 3078-3091.
BIS. (2015). Digital Currencies. Committee on Payment and Market Infrastructure. 
Basel, Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
Calem, P. S., and Mester, L, J. (1995). Consumer Behavior and the Stickiness of 
Credit Card Interest Rates. American Economic Review, 85 (5), 1327-1336.
Canner, G. B., and Cyrnak, A.W. (1985). Recent Development in Credit Card 
Holding and Use Patterns among U.S. Families. Journal of Retail Banking, 7, 
63-74
Christiano, L.J., M. Eichenbaum and C.L. Evans (1999). Monetary Policy Shocks: 
What Have we Learned and to What End? In: J.B. Taylor and M. Woodford 
(eds.): Handbook of Macroeconomics. Amsterdam
Cushman, D. O., and Zha, T. (1997). Identifying Monetary Policy in a Small Open 
Economy Under Flexible Exchange Rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 39, 
433-448
EIA. (2015). Short-Term Energy Outlook, US Energy Information Administration, 
September 2015.
Friedman, B. M. (1961). The Lag in Effect of Monetary Policy. Journal of Political 
Economy, 69, 447–66
Friedman, B. M. (1999). The Future of Monetary Policy: The Central Bank as an 
Army with only a Signal Corps? International Finance, 2, 321-338. 
Friedman, C. (2000). Monetary Policy Implementation: Past Present and Future— 
Will the Advent of Electronic Money Lead to the Demise of Central Banking? 
International Finance, 3, 211-227.
Fulford, S. L., and Schuh, S. (2017). Credit card utilization and consumption over 
the life cycle and business cycle, Working Papers 17-14, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Boston.
Geanakoplos, J., and Dubey, P. (2010). Credit cards and inflation, Games and 
Economic Behavior, 70, 325–353.
Goodhart, C. A. E. (2000). Can Central Banking Survive the IT Revolution? 
International Finance, 3, 189-209. 
Juhro, S. M, and Iyke, B. N (2019), Monetary Policy and Financial Conditions in 
Indonesia, Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 21, 284-302.
Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 22, Number 2, 2019162
Leigh, D. (2005). Estimating the Implicit Inflation Target: An Application to U.S. 
Monetary Policy, IMF Working Paper No. 05/77, April.
Lee, J., Strazicich, M.C. (2003). Minimum LM Unit Root Test with Two Structural 
Breaks. Review of Economics Statistics, 85, 1082–1089.
Lumsdaine, R.L., Papell, D.H. (1997). Multiple Trend Breaks and the Unit Root 
Hypothesis. Review of Economics and Statistics, 79, 212–218.
Mandell, L. (1972). Credit Card Use in the United States. Ann Arbor, Mich.: 
Institute for Social Research.
Narayan, P., and Popp, S. (2010). A New Unit Root Test with Two Structural Breaks 
in Level and Slope at Unknown Time. Journal of Applied Statistics, 37, 1425-1438.
Narayan, P.K., Susan, S., Poon, W.C., and Westerlund. (2014). Do Oil Prices Predict 
Economic Growth? New Global Evidence. Energy Economics 41, 137–146
OPEC. (2019). Monthly Bulletin, January, Organization of the Petroleum exporting 
courtiers.
Prabheesh, K.P., and Vidya, C.T.(2018). Do business cycles, investment-specific 
technology shocks matter for stock returns?. Economic Modelling, 70, 511-524.
Sharma, S.S., Tobing, L., and Azwar, P. (2018). Understanding Indonesia’s 
Macroeconomic Data: What Do We Know and What Are The Implications? 
Bulleting of Monetary Economics And Banking, 21, 218-250.
Sims, C. (1980). Macroeconomics and Reality. Econometrica, 48 (1), 1–48.
Sims, C. A. (1992). Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts. European 
Economic Review, 36, 975–1011.
Sims, C.A. (2007). Monetary Policy Models. Brookings Pap. Econ. Act. 38, 75–90, 
(Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution).
Soman, D. (2001). Effects of Payment Mechanism on Spending Behavior: The Role 
of Rehearsal and Immediacy of Payments. Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 
460-474.
Woodford, M. (2000). Monetary Policy in a World without Money. International 
Finance, 3, 229-260. 
World Bank. (2017). Global Findex Database, World Bank Group, Washington.
Yazgan, M.E., and Yilmazkuday, H. (2011). Effects of Credit and Debit Cards on 
the Currency Demand. Applied Economics, 41, 2115–2123
Yilmazkuday, H. (2011). Monetary Policy and Credit Cards: Evidence from a Small 
Open Economy. Economic Modelling. 28, 201–210.
Zhang, T. and DeVaney, S.A. (1999). Determinants of Consumer’s Debt Repayment 
Patterns. Consumer Interests Annual, 45, 67-70. 
